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This Essay begins with a survey of the protection afforded to foreign investors under custom-
ary international law. This survey serves to demonstrate that the changing international political
and social order, and international economic forces, affect the formulation of the standard of pro-
tection and compensation afforded to investors under international law. Next, the Essay traces the
history of the post-World War II attempts to negotiate multilateral investment protection measures
as part of the Havana Charter. As a result of the failure to implement the Havana Charter, nego-
tiations over investment measures did not make their way into the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade’s agenda until the Uruguay Round. This Essay discusses U.S. efforts to put negotiations
over investment measures back onto the world stage during the Uruguay Round negotiations, as
had happened half a century ago during the Havana Charter negotiations. The results achieved in
the Uruguay Round negotiations are discussed, and the reasons why negotiations on investment
measures were thereafter moved to the OECD are also described. This Essay highlights some
of the irreconcilable positions taken at the OECD during the MAI negotiations that prevented a
successful result. Thereafter, this Essay lists the many accomplishments among developed and
developing countries in reaching bilateral and regional investment agreements, which, in the long
run, should provide the basis for a high standard investment agreement to be negotiated under the
auspices of the WTO.
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For now, a multilateral agreement on investment ("MAI")
with high standards of liberalization and protection remains elu-
sive. The quest for such an agreement can be said to have begun
at least fifty years ago with the aborted Charter for an Interna-
tional Trade Organization' ("Havana Charter").
The recent attempts to negotiate a comprehensive agree-
ment on investment during the Uruguay Round provided lim-
ited success. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Mea-
sures' (or "TRIMs Agreement"), the General Agreement on
Trade in Services' (or "GATS"), and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights4 ("TRIPs") con-
tain provisions that confirm that some restrictive investment
measures hinder trade-in goods and services, as well as the trans-
fer of technology, and attempt to limit the use of such restrictive
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1. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Conference on
Trade & Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 2/78,
U.N. Sales No. II.D.4 (1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter].
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESuLTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOl. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement],
Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm (1994) [herein-
after the TRIMs Agreement].
3. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, An-
nex IB, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RSULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 28, 33 I.L.M. 1168
(1994) [hereinafter GATS].
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
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investment measures by the members of the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO"). These agreements, however, fall far short
of providing a comprehensive set of investment-liberalization
and investment-protection measures, which many capital-export-
ing countries wanted to negotiate at the WTO. Anxious to nego-
tiate "a high-quality investment agreement," in 1995 the capital-
exporting countries announced at the Council Meeting at the
Ministerial level of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development ("OECD") that they would create an MAI by
their 1997 Ministerial meeting. This OECD negotiated MAI
"would provide a broad multilateral framework for international
investment regimes" open to OECD and non-OECD member
countries. 5 This decision was reached based on the recommen-
dation of its committees that "the time is ripe to negotiate an
MAI in the OECD."6 The OECD was chosen as the place to ne-
gotiate and conclude such an agreement on the basis that its
membership, unlike the WTO's membership, consisted of "like-
minded" countries with well-established, liberal, and transparent
foreign investment policies. This, it was believed, would facili-
tate a fast-paced set of negotiations leading to a model agree-
ment that would provide a benchmark for investment protection
and liberalization. Furthermore, with the "free-standing" nature
of the agreement and its openness to OECD and non-OECD
countries alike, it could, thereafter, be moved to a multilateral
forum such as the WTO.7 At such time, the many WTO develop-
ing-country members that hindered progress on an MAI during
the discussions leading up to the Uruguay Round negotiations
would face a fait accompli, thereby making unlikely the accept-
ance of their objections and requests for modification. How-
ever, the like-minded countries of the OECD failed to reach an
agreement, even after an extension of the initial two-year dead-
line. By October 1998, the negotiations had come to an inauspi-
cious end.
5. UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
("OECD"), THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: THE ORIGINAL MANDATE
(1995), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/fdi/mai/mandate.htm.
6. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES ("CIME") AND THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND INVISIBLE
TRANSACTIONS ("CMIT"), OECD, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (1995),
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/fdi/mai/mairap95.htm.
7. Id.
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In the meantime and paradoxically, bilateral and regional
agreements on investment have proliferated in all regions of the
world not only between developed and developing countries, as
was the case in earlier years, but now also between developing
countries. Indeed, recently the developing countries have been
most active in negotiating regional economic co-operative agree-
ments, many of which provide for investment liberalization and
protection measures.
What then is the prognosis for an MAI that provides for
high standards of liberalization and protection of investment
that includes developed and developing countries among its sig-
natories? This Essay argues that such an agreement can likely be
achieved only in a forum such as the WTO and that it can be
achieved because of the inclusive nature of the WTO and its
comprehensive trade agenda.' However, it also will be argued
that the time is not yet ripe for negotiating an MAI at the WTO.
Many more bilateral and regional agreements on investment
have to be negotiated and concluded. Furthermore, only after
the benefits of such agreements have been realized by both de-
veloped and developing countries will it be time to negotiate an
MAI.
Until then, significant advancement opportunities continue
to exist at the WTO in the area of investment liberalization. The
built-in agenda in GATS should provide a further basis for in-
creasing the liberalization of investment measures as they affect
service providers requiring a commercial presence in another
country to export their services. The TRIMs Agreement, in addi-
tion to setting out its own starting point for further negotiations
on investment measures, also requires all member countries,
subject to some transition periods, to eliminate notified trade
related investment measures ("TRIMs"). Lastly, TRIPs protects
intellectual property under the ambit of trade. The benefits of
these new Uruguay Round agreements are yet to be fully real-
ised.
This Essay begins with a survey of the protection afforded to
foreign investors under customary international law. This survey
serves to demonstrate that the changing international political
and social order, and international economic forces, affect the
8. William A. Dymond, The MA!: A Sad and Melancholy Tale, in CANADA AMONG
NATIONS 1999: A BIG LEAGUE PLAYER? (Fen Osler et al. eds., 1999).
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formulation of the standard of protection and compensation af-
forded to investors under international law. It has not always
been possible to provide a clear formulation of the level of pro-
tection and compensation to be accorded to foreign investors
whose property has been subject to expropriation measures.
This, indeed, is the fundamental basis for the argument export-
ing countries make that the world needs an MAI providing for a
high standard of investment protection.
Next, the Essay traces the history of the post-World War II
attempts to negotiate multilateral investment protection mea-
sures as part of the Havana Charter. As a result of the failure to
implement the Havana Charter, negotiations over investment
measures did not make their way into the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade's' ("GATT") agenda until the Uruguay Round.
This Essay discusses U.S. efforts to put negotiations over invest-
ment measures back onto the world stage during the Uruguay
Round negotiations, as had happened half a century ago during
the Havana Charter negotiations. The results achieved in the
Uruguay Round negotiations are discussed, and the reasons why
negotiations on investment measures were thereafter moved to
the OECD are also described.
This Essay highlights some of the irreconcilable positions
taken at the OECD during the MAI negotiations that prevented
a successful result. Thereafter, this Essay lists the many accom-
plishments among developed and developing countries in reach-
ing bilateral and regional investment agreements, which, in the
long run, should provide the basis for a high standard invest-
ment agreement to be negotiated under the auspices of the
WTO.
I. PROTECTION AFFORDED TO FOREIGN INVESTORS UNDER
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is beyond question that expropriation in one form or an-
other is admitted and practiced by all states. In so far as mea-
sures of expropriation only affect the nationals of the state carry-
ing them out, there are no interests of foreigners to be protected
and, to date, international law has not limited a state's jurisdic-
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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tion in this field.1 ° However, where acts of expropriation are di-
rected at, or affect property owned by, foreigners, a question of
international law arises whether the expropriation and the ex-
tent of compensation afforded are contrary to international law,
thereby entitling the home state of the foreign investor to inter-
vene on that investor's behalf to obtain redress."
It is difficult enough in the presence of a treaty to deter-
mine whether measures taken by a state amount to an expropria-
tion without adequate compensation resulting in a breach of in-
ternational law. 12 The absence of a treaty that sets out the pro-
tection agreed to be provided to foreign investments greatly
exacerbates the problem. This is because the home state of the
foreign investor is required to prove that the host state's mea-
sures, including the manner in which such measures were car-
ried out, constitute an expropriation that is contrary to custom-
ary international law and that the amount, if any, of compensa-
10. The recognition of this principle may be found in, among other sources, the
statement issued on August 2, 1956 by the Governments of France, the United King-
dom, and the United States of America regarding the Egyptian decree of July 26, 1956,
expropriating the Suez Canal Company. Paragraph 2 of the statement reads: "[We] do
not question the right of Egypt to enjoy and exercise all the powers of a fully sovereign
and independent nation, including the generally recognized right, under appropriate
conditions, to nationalize assets, not imposed with an international interest, which are
subject to its political authority." The Suez Canal Conference, Selected Documents, London,
August 2-24, 1956. Egypt No. 1 (1956), Cmd. 9853, p. 3 . See also the position of the
United States in The United States of America on Behalf of George W. Hopkins v. The United
Mexican States (Docket No. 39), (1926), 21 A.J.I.L. 160, at 166-7 (1927).
11. In the case of the Mavrommatis Palestinian Concession, the Permanent Court of
International Justice said, "[1]t is an elementary principle of international law that a
State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law
committed by another State." Mavrommatis Palestinian Concession Case (Greece v.
U.K) [1924] P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12.
12. The primary sources of international law are treaties, custom, and general
principles of law. See Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993, which states as follows:
(1) The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various na-
tions, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
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tion afforded falls below the requirements of customary
international law. In order to prove that a rule is part of custom-
ary international law, it is necessary to show that the consistent
practice of states has evolved into opiniojuris."
An analysis of the evolution of the customary international
law of investment and protection of foreign investment indicates
that its formulation at any point in time is affected by current
international political and social order, and international eco -
nomic forces. This then partly serves as the basis for the argu-
ment put forward by those advocating a multilateral agreement
to protect investments, hoping as they do to codify and establish
high standards of treatment for foreign investments by host
states. An MAI also can provide for a comprehensive set of prin-
ciples governing foreign investors and their investments, in addi-
tion to the treatment to be accorded to foreign investors in in-
stances of the expropriation of their investments by host states.
Among other provisions, an MAI can set out definition for the
types of investments deserving of protection, procedures for set-
tling investment disputes, liberalization obligations, non-discrim-
inatory treatment provisions, local content and other perform-
ance requirements, repatriation of income and capital, transfer
of personnel, and other activities that necessarily accompany the
making of foreign investments.
A. The Traditional Formulation
The traditional formulation of international law, as it relates
to a host state's duty to a foreign investor, can be traced back to
the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen, which declared property an uninfringeable right, but
permitted nationalization in instances of public necessity.' 4 The
current restatement of this traditional formulation of customary
international law relating to foreign investments provides that
13. Merrills points out that "there is some disagreement as to how strictly the re-
quirement of opinio juris should be interpreted, the most realistic view will sometimes
permit it to be inferred from the context of the actions in question. Be that as it may, it
is clear that in practice the requirements of constant and uniform usage and opiniojuris
frequently stand or fall together." J.G. MERRILLS, ANATOMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 4-5
(1981).
14. Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in Interna-
tional Law, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 275
(1982).
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expropriation can be effected by a sovereign state when it is for a
public purpose, non-discriminatory, and undertaken with due
process of law. Further, when a host state expropriates the prop-
erty of a foreign investor, it is required to pay "prompt, adequate
and effective" compensation to the foreign owner. The then-
U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull articulated this rule at the
time of the Mexican nationalization of 1938. In his letters to the
Mexican government, Hull declared that a state that is not in the
position to afford prompt, adequate, and effective compensation
to expropriated foreign investors ought to refrain from enacting
measures of expropriation. 15 This formula, dubbed the "Hull
Formula," was again applied in 1960 by the U.S. government in
challenging the legality of the Cuban nationalization of various
American properties."
The approach of the United Kingdom was similar to that of
the United States. In its memorial for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com-
pany Case,'7 the United Kingdom argued that the international
lawfulness of the expropriation of foreigners' property is condi-
tional upon the obligation to make "adequate, effective and
prompt" compensation."
15. G.H. Hackworth, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 655-65 (1942). Secretary C.
Hull's initial letter of July 21, 1938, states the issue and the position taken. "During
recent years the Government of the United States has upon repeated occasions made
representations to the Government of Mexico with regard to the continuing expropria-
tion by Your Excellency's Government of agrarian properties owned by American citi-
zens, without adequate, effective and prompt compensation being made therefore." Id.
16. Francesco Francioni, Compensation for Nationalization of Foreign Property: The Bor-
derland between Law and Equity, 24 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 255, 263-64 (1975). Professor
Francioni notes:
[This] requirement of prompt, full and effective indemnification was so rigidly
adhered to so as to provoke a refusal of an offer of deferred payment made by
the Castro Government in the form of bonds bearing 21/2 percent interest.
The same pattern was followed by the U.S. Department of State in 1963 in
connection with the Ceylonese nationalizations of oil and gas business, which
gave arise to a suspension of foreign aid to Ceylon ....
Id.
17. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (U.K. v. Iran), 1951 I.C.J. 106 (Aug. 22). It is to be
noted that the actual decision was rendered on the question ofjurisdiction and not on
the merits.
18. To support its position, the U.K. Memorial refers to the Chorz6w Factory,
Claim for Indemnity (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sep. 13); Goldenberg
& Sons v. Germany (Rom. v. Ger.) (1927-28), 4 Ann. Dig. 369; Norwegian Ship Owners'
Claim (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R.I.A.A. 307 (1922); Spanish Zones of Morocco Case (U.K. v.
Spain), 2 R.I.A.A. 615 (1924); and the De Sabla Claim (U.S. v. Pan.), 6 R.I.A.A. 358
(1933). The Memorial also referred to the writings of a significant number of publicists
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B. Early Challenges to the Traditional Formulation
The earliest challenge to this traditional formulation began
with the Soviet nationalization program following the Revolution
of 1917.19 Despite this major blow to the traditional formulation
of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation, it would be
correct to conclude that Secretary Cordell Hull accurately
presented the pre-World War II position when, in 1938, he wrote
his famous letter to the Mexican Ambassador.20
Only later, when the Soviet Union was joined by other na-
tions, could it be said that the traditional formulation encoun-
tered severe challenges. The main thrust of these challenges be-
gan around the time when Mexico refused to comply with the
demands set out in Secretary Hull's letter. Despite strong pres-
sures from the U.S. Department of State and a breach of diplo-
matic relations with the United Kingdom, the Mexican govern-
ment insisted that, as a matter of legal obligation, no compensa-
tion was due for property that a state had expropriated in the
pursuit of a social reform program upon which economic devel-
opment, as well as the well-being of its people, was dependent. 2
1
The Mexican position was based on an inability to pay and on
what is commonly referred to as the Calvo doctrine. 22 This Latin
American doctrine was based on the notion of the exclusive ju-
risdiction of any state over its territory and on the view that for-
eigners have no more rights than nationals of the state in which
they live or enjoy personal rights. Therefore, the domestic
courts of the host states exclusively decided the rights and claims
of aliens against host states. In the context of expropriation of a
who adhered to the traditional view. See B.A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 34-35 (1959).
19. The effective outcome of this nationalization program was:
the outright refusal to pay any compensation, aside from some conventional
arrangements made for political reasons. On a doctrinal level, the impact of
the Soviet nationalization had the effect of stimulating a critical revision of the
... assumption that absolute respect for private property constitutes a general
principle of law recognized by civilized nations.
Francioni, supra note 16, at 267.
20. As White explains, "denial of a rule by a single State cannot affect its validity on
the international level. It may be otherwise when many States adopt this attitude over a
period of years; such practice may well result in the abrogation, or at any rate, to the
modification of the customary rule." See GILLIAN MARY WHITE, NATIONALIZATION OF
FOREIGN PROPERTY 9 (1961).
21. Francioni, supra note 16, at 267.
22. CHARLES CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 231 (5th ed. 1885).
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foreigner's property, the doctrine provided that the foreigner
had acquired no right to permit his home state to exercise diplo-
matic protection.23
C. Challenges Based on U.N. General Assembly Resolutions
Thereafter, other less developed and newly independent
states, through various resolutions in the General Assembly of
the United Nations, challenged the traditional notion of protec-
tion over foreign investments driven in part by their dissatisfac-
tion with the concession agreements that the colonial govern-
ments had entered into with foreign companies. 24 The process
started in 1952 with Resolution 626, which stated that "the right
of people freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and re-
sources is inherent in their sovereignty. '25 This principle ap-
peared in a more elaborate form in General Assembly Resolu-
tion 1803 entitled "Resolution of Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources. ' 26 The challenges culminated with Resolu-
23. Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75
AM.J. INT'L L. 533, 559 n.28 (1981). In its reply of August 3, 1938, to the U.S. Ambassa-
dor, Mexico stated:
The jurisdiction of the States within the .limits of the national territory, is ap-
plicable to all its inhabitants. Nationals and foreigners who are under the
same protection of the national legislation and authorities cannot claim rights
different from or more extensive than nationals ... [A]s your government is
not aware that our government finds itself unable to pay the indemnity to all
affected by the Agrarian Reform, by insisting on payment to American land-
holders, it demands, in reality, a special privileged treatment which no one is
receiving in Mexico.
Press Release, Department of State (Aug. 3, 1938).
24. Higgins, supra note 14, at 287.
25. For the full text of G.A. Res. 626 (VIII), see 7 U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No.,
20 at 106, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952).
26. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
Dec. 14, 1962, 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963). Paragraph 4 discusses the approach toward expro-
priation and compensation in the following terms:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as
overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign.
In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation in accordance with
the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and
in accordance with international law. In any case where the question of compen-
sation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such
measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and
other parties concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through
arbitration or international adjudication.
Id. (emphasis added).
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tion 3281, the "United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States."27
While the General Assembly resolutions, unlike those of the
Security Council, are not imbued with obligatory effect, 28 it is
indisputable that they have heavily influenced the course and
direction of the international law of foreign investment. Sole Ar-
bitrator Mahmassani in Libyan American Oil Co. v. The Government
of the Libyan Arab Republic ("LIAMCO Arbitration") opined that,
while the General Assembly resolutions were not a unanimous
source of law, they were "evidence of the recent dominant trend
of international opinion concerning the sovereign right of States
over natural resources. ' 29 This decision followed the reasoning
of Sole Arbitrator Dupuy's reasoning in Texaco Overseas Petroleum
Co. v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic3" ("Texaco-Libya
Arbitration") who, in order to determine the state of interna-
tional law on the subject of investment protection, analyzed the
voting pattern of General Assembly resolutions. Dupuy noted
that Resolution 1803 had been passed by an eighty-seven to two
vote, with twelve abstentions. Dupuy also noted that a number
of developed Western countries with market economies, includ-
ing the United States, had voted in favor of the principles in
Resolution 1803, which had been stipulated to by a majority of
states representing all geographic regions and economic sys-
tems.3 '
Thus, while no simple answer can be given as to the effect of
these General Assembly resolutions, they undoubtedly rendered
a severe blow to the traditional formulation of protecting foreign
investments and the acceptance of this formulation as articulat-
ing customary international law relating to expropriations.
These U.N. General Assembly resolutions confirm that interna-
27. For the full text of G.A. Res. 3281, see Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, Dec. 12, 1974, 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975).
28. It was never intended that the General Assembly be a legislative organ. At the
San Francisco Conference in 1945, the Philippine delegation suggested that the Gen-
eral Assembly be vested with legislative authority to enact rules of international law that
would -become effective and binding upon members after such rules had been ap-
proved by a majority vote of the Security Council. When the resolution was put to a
vote, it was rejected 26 to 1.
29. 20 I.L.M. 1, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
30. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. The Government of Libyan Arab Republic
(U.S. v. Libya), 1977 I.CJ. 2 (June 1977).
31. Id. at 487.
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tional law is essentially an evolutionary process and that, interna-
tionally, norms are not immutable or static. They are influenced
and shaped by the changing needs and realities of the interna-
tional community. 3
2
D. A Return to the Traditional Formulation
By the mid-1980s, it could be argued that international
opinion on the protection afforded to foreign investors began to
revert closer to the traditional formulation. As the less- devel-
oped countries sought to attract foreign investment, they also
adopted, in a number of bilateral treaties, some of the interna-
tional law principles, including the Hull Formula, that are de-
manded of the home countries of foreign investors-predomi-
nantly the Western industrialized countries. It is still open for
debate as to whether the incorporation of principles that accord
with the traditional formulation of the law of expropriation into
bilateral investment treaties have had an effect on the current
principles of customary international law relating to foreign in-
vestments. While bilateral treaties are generally recognized as
sources of international law, such investment treaties also can be
characterized simply as the reciprocal arrangements of the par-
ties engaged in advancing their own isolated trade and financial
gains. 3
Further concessions to, and acceptance of, the traditional
formulation of the treatment of foreign investors emerged in the
wake of the opening of markets in much of Eastern Europe. An
example of such concessions, on the part of formerly socialist
states, is the Energy Charter Treaty34 ("Energy Charter"). Part
III of the Energy Charter, entitled "Investment Promotion and
Protection," creates a multilateral investment regime for private
investors in the energy sector, and provides many benefits to
such investors including an investor-state dispute settlement
32. Samuel A.K. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal, 37
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 588, 626 (1988).
33. See OscAR SHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRAcricE 323 (1991)
(explaining that inclusion of Hull Formula in bilateral investment treaties reflects cus-
tomary international law). But see Asante, supra note 32, at 607.
34. Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, Annex 1, 34 I.L.M. 360, 381 [hereinafter
the Energy Charter]. Signed in Lisbon on December 17, 1994, by countries from the
OECD, as well as East European and Commonwealth of Independent States ("CIS")
countries.
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mechanism. In addition, Article 13(1) of the Energy Charter in-
corporates the traditional formulation of the law on investment
protection when it defines the conditions under which a state
may carry out an expropriation. 5
The proliferation of bilateral investment treaties and re-
gional investment agreements over the last decade may be a re-
flection of a movement back towards a more traditional formula-
tion of protection to be afforded to foreign investors by interna-
tional law. Thus, international customary law, as it relates to
expropriation of foreign investments, continues to be fluid and
uncertain and calls for the formulation of new standards. 36 This
may explain the efforts by Western industrialized countries to
formulate and codify in multilateral fora investment provisions
that protect foreign investors, and the strong resistance they
have faced from those most likely to be challenged for taking
measures amounting to an expropriation with less than prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation. However, as noted ear-
lier, the disagreements as to the full scope of protection to be
afforded to foreign investors may not be limited to the schism
between the developed and the less-developed countries. As the
recently failed MAI negotiations at the OECD indicate, divisions
exist even among the developed countries as to the full scope of
protection to be afforded to foreign investors.
II. HISTORY OF INVESTMENT MEASURES-HAVANA
CHARTER TO WTO
At the end of World War II, and prompted mainly by the
United States, members of the United Nations began to negoti-
ate a Charter for an International Trade Organization ("ITO")
under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social
35. Id. art. 13. Article 13(1) of the Energy Charter states in part as follows:
Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Con-
tracting Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a mea-
sure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation
(hereinafter referred to as "Expropriation") except where such Expropriation
is:
(a) for a purpose which is in the public interest;
(b) not discriminatory;
(c) carried out under due process of law; and accompanied by the pay-
ment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
Id.
36. Asante, supra note 32, at 626.
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Council. The negotiations, which culminated in Havana, Cuba,
envisaged the ITO as the third component of the post-war Bret-
ton Woods system, in conjunction with the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (now the World Bank)
and the International Monetary Fund. Prior to finalizing the
Havana Charter, however, the United States and the United
Kingdom urged the negotiation of GATT, in order to set out
multilateral tariff concessions. As such, GATT was devised as a
part of the ITO system and not as a free-standing agreement."
A. An Inauspicious Start
At the strong instigation of the U.S. delegation, the Havana
Charter negotiators included investment measures in their dis-
cussions. The intention of the United States was to provide a
multilateral code focussed on protecting foreign investment
from discrimination and nationalization by host countries. How-
ever, the resulting negotiated text was quite inimical to this goal.
Indeed, in their final form, the investment measures contained
in the Havana Charter did not limit the rights of host states to
restrict foreign investment, reflecting the significant offsetting
pressure to that of the United States from the capital importing
states within the ITO negotiations.38 Article 12 of the Havana
Charter, entitled "International Investment for Economic Devel-
opment and Reconstruction," recognized the value of invest-
ment in promoting development, and encouraged countries to
afford investors from other countries opportunities and security
for their investments without discrimination on the basis of na-
tionality. The Havana Charter, however, also codified the right
of any member to "take any appropriate safeguards necessary" to
ensure that foreign investment does not interfere in a country's
internal affairs. The Havana Charter allowed members to "de-
termine whether and to what extent and upon what terms it will
allow future foreign investment" and to establish "other reasona-
37. Eric M. Burt, Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign
Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization, 12 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1015, 1027
(1997); see also Todd S. Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral Investment
Treaties and the GATT: Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U. Prir. L. REv.
541, 555 (1994).
38. JoAN EDELMAN SPERO, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
136-37 (4th ed. 1990).
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ble requirements" with respect to foreign investments."9 Under
the foregoing provisions domestic policy goals were to be priori-
tized over international standards for investment policy.
The emphasis on economic development over international
standards for protection of foreign investment sparked opposi-
tion to the Havana Charter from the very U.S.-based, multina-
tional enterprises that had initially spearheaded the initiative to
include investment provisions in an international economic
agreement. In their view, the Havana Charter's investment pro-
visions gave too much protection to developing countries. On
the other hand, developing countries viewed the provisions as
too permissive to multinational enterprises.4 ° It was partly as a
result of these disagreements that the Havana Charter was even-
tually abandoned." Since GATT was not initially conceived as a
comprehensive multilateral agreement, it did not contain any
provisions related to investment measures.
B. Waiting Half a Century for Another Start
Investment discussions did not make their way on to the
GATT negotiating agenda until the Uruguay Round. The only
attempt to introduce the subject of investment in GATT hap-
pened in 1955 when, at the suggestion of the Chilean delega-
tion, the Contracting Parties adopted the Resolution on Interna-
tional Investment for Economic Development42 ("Resolution"). The
Resolution, however, did no more than urge capital-exporting
and capital-importing countries to "use their best endeavours to
create conditions calculated to stimulate the international flow
of capital" by entering into bilateral and multilateral agreements
to provide for security for investments, avoidance of double taxa-
tion, and facilitation of the repatriation of funds of foreign in-
vestments.
43
A proposal dealing with investment submitted by the United
39. Havana Charter art. 12. See also Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy III, Agree-
ment on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS): Limitations and Prospects for the Future,
in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE
21ST CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION (1996)
40. Burt, supra note 37, at 1029; Shenkin, supra note 37, at 556.
41. SPERO, supra note 38, at 137. For a discussion of the reasons for the demise of
the Havana Charter, see Shenkin, supra note 36, at 556-57.
42. International Investment for Economic Development Resolution, Mar. 4, 1955,
GATT B.I.S.D. (3d Supp.) at 49-51 (1955).
43. Id.; see also Price & Christy, supra note 39, at 444-45.
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States to the Preparatory Committee for the 1982 Tokyo Round
was greeted with indifference even from the industrialized coun-
tries of the EEC.44
Nevertheless, in March 1982, the United States managed to
make investment a matter of significant importance at the Tokyo
Round when it referred to the Contracting Parties the Canadian
Foreign Investment Review Act45 ("FIRA"). Pursuant to this legisla-
tion, foreign investment was allowed into Canada only if the Ca-
nadian government determined that the investment was or was
likely to be of "significant benefit to Canada." Whether an in-
vestment was of.significant benefit was determined by looking at,
inter alia, the effects of the proposed investment on employment
within Canada, satisfying Canadian content requirements in
goods produced in Canada, and evaluating the effect of the for-
eign- investment on Canadian technological development.46
Under the FIRA, foreign investors could also be asked to pro-
pose voluntary performance undertakings ("written undertak-
ings"), requiring them to satisfy local content and export per-
formance requirements, which became legally binding on the in-
vestors once the investment was approved. The central issue in
the GATT dispute became whether the local content and export
performance requirements were inconsistent with Canada's
GATT obligations.47
In its ruling, the GATT Panel stressed the fact that the dis-
pute concerned the consistency of specific trade-related mea-
sures taken by Canada under its foreign investment legislation
with GATT, as opposed to Canada's right to regulate foreign in-
vestment.48 The Panel agreed with the United States that the
written undertakings requiring an investor to satisfy local con-
tent requirements contravened the national treatment obliga-
tion of GATT Article III(4). 49 On the other hand, the Panel
ruled that the. FIRA's export performance requirements were
44. See Mina Mashyekhi & Murray Gibbs, Lessons from the Uruguay Round Negotiations
on Investment, 33J. OF WORLD TRADE 1, 7 (1999).
45. Foreign Investment Review Act, S.C., ch. 39, 1973-74 (repealed 1985) (Can.).
46. Id. § 2(2).
47. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Complaint Concerning the Adminis-
tration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140 (1984)
[hereinafter the FIRA Panel Report].
48. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRIMS: BACKGROUND, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis_e/eol/ e/wtoO5/wto5_3.htm.
49. See FIRA Panel Report at 160.
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not inconsistent with GATT.5° The Panel's reluctance to pass
judgment on Canada's treatment of foreign investors can be
gleaned from the following passage:
[T]he Panel does not consider it relevant nor does it feel
competent to judge how foreign investors are affected by the
purchase requirements, as the national treatment obligations
of Article III of the General Agreement do not apply to for-
eign persons but to imported products and serve to protect
the interests of producers and exporters established on the
territory of any contracting party.51
C. A Compromise Leading to the Uruguay Round
At the fourth meeting of the Preparatory Committee lead-
ing up to the Punta Del Este Ministerial Meeting in March 1986,
the United States again tabled the subject of investment mea-
sures for negotiation. As was the case in previous attempts,52 the
U.S. initiative to include investment negotiations in the Uruguay
Round did not enjoy sufficient support. However, this time a
careful compromise was reached," and the 1986 Punta del Este
Ministerial Declaration that launched the Uruguay Round54 con-
tained a commitment to include trade-related investment mea-
sures among the new subjects for negotiation.
The negotiations on TRIMs were largely split along the lines
of developed capital-exporting and developing capital-importing
countries. The former, led by the United States, sought to
achieve a strong agreement in GATT for the protection of invest-
ment, while the latter, led by India, maintained that rules on
TRIMs would not allow them to implement their own develop-
ment strategies. Furthermore, developing countries argued that
the prohibition of TRIMs failed to take into consideration the
50. Id. at 164.
51. Id. at 167.
52. For a description of prior instances when the United States attempted to dis-
cuss investment measures within GATT, see Price & Christy, supra note 39, at 446.
53. The inclusion of TRIMs in the Uruguay negotiating agenda was part of a care-
ful compromise that was drafted as follows in the Ministerial Declaration of Punta Del
Este, GATI Doc. 86-1572, B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 9 (1986) [hereinafter the Punta Del
Este Declaration]. "Following an examination of the operation of GATT Articles re-
lated to the trade-restrictive and trade-distorting effects of investment measures, negotiations
should elaborate, as appropriate, further provisions that may be necessary to avoid such
adverse effects on trade." Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id.
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restrictive business practices of multinational enterprises.55
D. The Results of the Uruguay Round
1. Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures
The agreement that resulted from the Uruguay Round sets
out the compromise reached between the two opposing posi-
tions within GATT -on investment measures. Therefore, while
the preamble of the TRIMs Agreement includes the goal of
"facilitat[ing] investment across international frontiers so as to
increase the economic growth of all trading partners, particu-
larly developing country members, while ensuring free competi-
tion," Article 1 specifies that the TRIMs Agreement "applies to
investment measures related to trade in goods only." As such,
the TRIMs Agreement has been widely criticized as being "ex-
tremely limited in scope and.., largely attuned to the concerns
of an era in policy-making characterized more by suspicion of-
and the need to control-foreign investment than by keenness
to compete for and attract such investment. "56
Article 2, which contains the central obligation of the
TRIMs Agreement, provides that Members shall not apply
TRIMs that contravene the national treatment requirement in
Article III and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions in Ar-
ticle XI of GATT. In addition, the TRIMs Agreement provides in
an Annex an "illustrative list" of TRIMs that are inconsistent with
Articles III and XI of GATT. The illustrative list covers local con-
tent requirements, trade-balancing measures (i.e., measures that
limit an enterprise in purchasing imported product in accor-
dance with the amount of domestic products that the same en-
terprise exports), foreign-exchange balancing requirements, and
measures that restrict exports. Consistent with the GATT Panel
decision in FIRA, the illustrative list does not cover export incen-
tives and export performance requirements.
Measures inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement were to
be notified to the Council for Trade in Goods within ninety days
55. For a detailed description of the positions of the various countries on TRIMs at
the Uruguay Round's GATT Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Investment Mea-
sures, see Price & Christy, supra note 39, at 447-51.
56. Pierre Sauv6, Regional Versus Multilateral Approaches to Services and Investment Lib-
eralization: Anything to Worry About?, in REGIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM AFTER THE
URUGUAY ROUND 429, 437(1997).
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of the entry into force of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization 57 ("WTO Agreement"). How-
ever, the TRIMs Agreement provides for a transitional period to
eliminate TRIMs so notified. Developed country Members were
given two years from the entry into force of the WTO Agreement
to eliminate their GATT-inconsistent TRIMs, while developing
country and least-developed country Members were afforded five
and seven years, respectively. 58 The transition period for devel-
oping countries to eliminate TRIMs that were notified to the
Council for Trade in Goods ended on January 1, 2000. Some of
those countries are currently seeking an extension of their dead-
line for certain sectors of their economies.
59
Despite its limitations, the TRIMs Agreement provides WTO
members certain advantages. First, the TRIMs Agreement, by
setting out, in detail, the types of measures prohibited under Ar-
ticles III and XI of GATT 1994, provides a further degree of clar-
ification. It is also important to note that the non-exhaustive
character of the Illustrative List allows additional prohibited
measures to be added in the future.6 ° Second, by providing for
notification requirements, transition periods for the elimination
of prohibited TRIMs and for the creation of a Committee on
TRIMs,6 ' the TRIMs Agreement increases transparency. Finally,
the TRIMs Agreement, in contrast to the Panel decision on
FIRA, confirms the extent of limitations on TRIMs that apply to
developing countries.62
Most importantly, the strength of the TRIMs Agreement is
that it provides the starting point for multilateral negotiations on
investment measures, particularly through Article 9, which reads
as follows:
57. TRIMs Agreement art. 5.1; WTO Agreement art. V.
58. TRIMs Agreement art. 5.2; WTO Agreement art. V.
59. See, inter alia, VTO Holds Off on Ways to Deal with Extensions of TRIMs Deadline,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 28, 2000; WTO Wrestles with Ways to Deal with TRMs Implementa-
tion, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 21, 2000; WIO Resolves Fight Over Implementation Talks, Im-
pact on New Round, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 5, 2000; WTO Sets Up Review of TRIMs Exten-
sions, Implementation Demands, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 12, 2000; Countries Still Far Apart
on Particulars of TRIMs Extensions, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 17, 2000.
60. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE: URUGUAY ROUND FINAL ACT SHOULD PRODUCE OVERALL U.S. ECONOMIC
GAINS 106 (1994).
61. TRIMs Agreement art. 7.
62. Price & Christy, supra note 39, at 453.
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Not later than five years after the date of entry into force of
the WTO Agreement, the Council for Trade in Goods shall
review the operation of this Agreement and, as appropriate,
propose to the Ministerial Conference amendments to its
text. In the course of this review, the Council for Trade in Goods
shall consider whether the Agreement should be complemented with
provisions on investment policy and competition policy.
63
2. General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATS also negotiated during the Uruguay Round at the
urging of the United States,6 4 has been labelled the WTO's true
investment agreement.6 ' GATS applies GATT principles of na-
tional treatment and most-favoured nation ("MFN") treatment
to the following four methods of providing an international ser-
vice: (i) cross-border supply, (ii) consumption abroad (e.g.,
tourism), (iii) commercial presence, and (iv) presence of natu-
ral persons. Under GATS, however, national treatment applies
only if a country has made a specific commitment with respect to
a service, and certain exemptions are allowed. With respect to
MFN treatment, if a country allows foreign competition in a ser-
vice sector, equal opportunities in that sector should be given to
service providers from all other WTO members, with special
temporary exemptions allowed in certain cases.66
Of particular relevance to the liberalization of investment
are two provisions of GATS. First, the concept of "commercial
63. TRIMs Agreement art. 9 (emphasis added).
64. The impetus to negotiate CATS came again from the United States. In 1974,
in the context of the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, the U.S. Congress gave au-
thority to the President to negotiate a multilateral services agreement. This mandate
was reconfirmed in 1984 to pursue the elimination or reduction of barriers and distor-
tions to trade in services in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. Thus, the con-
clusion of the GATS in the Uruguay Round represents a triumph of the U.S. position.
It should be noted, however, that the inclusion of GATS in the Uruguay Round came
only after the United States threatened to leave GATT if there were no services negotia-
tions. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 60.
65. Burt, supra note 37, at 1031; Price & Christy, supra note 39, at 454.
66. WTO Secretariat, An Introduction to the GATS, at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/serve/gsintre.doc. When GATS came into force, a number of countries al-
ready had preferential agreements for services that they had signed with trading part-
ners, either bilaterally or in small groups, which WTO members felt were necessary to
maintain temporarily. They gave themselves the right to continue giving more favour-
able treatment to certain countries in particular service activities by listing "MFN ex-
emptions." These exemptions could only be made once, were to be reviewed after five
years, and would normally last no more than 10 years.
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presence" introduces into the WTO the idea that trade can be
carried out through investment.6 7 Second, GATS requires gov-
ernments not to restrict the transfers of funds received as pay-
ment for services out of their countries once a commitment has
been made to open a certain service sector to foreign competi-
tion. The only limited exception to this principle provided
under the GATS is when a country encounters balance-of-pay-
ments difficulties. 68
GATS is based on a "positive list" approach, where Members
make specific commitments to open their markets to foreign
competition in specific sectors. These commitments appear in
separate national schedules that set out the sectors being
opened, the extent of market access being given in those sectors,
and the mode by which the services in question are to be pro-
vided, as well as any limitations on national treatment. In addi-
tion to the national schedules of specific commitments, GATS
contains a number of annexes for different sectors that recog-
nize the diversity of trade in services. The subject matter ad-
dressed in the GATS annexes include: (i) the movement of nat-
ural persons with negotiations on individuals' rights to stay tem-
porarily in a country for the purpose of providing a service, (ii)
air transport services, under which traffic rights and directly re-
lated activities are excluded from coverage, (iii) specific commit-
ments in financial services negotiations, which continued after
the end of the Uruguay Round and concluded in late 1997, and
(iv) specific commitments in telecommunications negotiations,
which resumed after the Uruguay Round and led to a new agree-
ment in February of 1997.
3. Agreement on TRIPs
Another important development in the area of investment
during the Uruguay Round was the negotiation of TRIPs, which
provides for the protection of intellectual property under the
ambit of trade. A transfer of technology accompanies the great
majority of foreign investment from multinational enterprises in
home countries to their subsidiaries in host countries. The pro-
tection of such technology removes another source of insecurity
for foreign investors and promotes the transfer of technology be-
67. GATS art. 1 (2) (d).
68. Id. art. 12.
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tween countries, in particular between developed and develop-
69ing countries.
E. Dissatisfaction with the Results of the Uruguay Round
Despite the negotiations and achievements of the TRIMs
Agreement, GATS, and TRIPs during the Uruguay Round, most
industrialized countries, particularly the members of the OECD,
left the Uruguay Round with a sense that they had been defeated
by the developing world in their quest to achieve a high degree
of investment liberalization within the WTO. In the view of the
OECD Members, the proliferation of bilateral investment trea-
ties and regional economic integration agreements, which in-
cluded high standards of investment protection (e.g., the North
American Free Trade Agreement7 ° ("NAFTA") and the Energy
Charter), demonstrated that the time was ripe to negotiate a
multilateral investment treaty.
As a result, in May 1995, the OECD Ministers established a
negotiating group to begin consultations on an MAI that would
set out high standards for the liberalization of investment and
protection of investors. While the MAI would be open for signa-
ture to all countries, the OECD Members opted to negotiate
within their organization while granting other interested coun-
tries, such as Brazil and Argentina, observer status. The motive
for confining the MAI negotiations to the OECD, with the stated
objective of a stipulated time frame for the conclusion of the
MAI (May 1997), was to achieve an investment agreement within
the confines of industrialized countries, which would then be
opened for signature to other countries.
III. THE OECD MULTILATERAL AGRFEMENT
ON INVESTMENT
Prior to the decision to initiate negotiations on the MAI, the
OECD undertook a number of initiatives to promote the liberali-
zation of foreign investment among its members. From its in-
ception, the OECD received the mandate from its members to
work toward the liberalization of cross-border flows of goods,
capital, and services. As such, in 1961, the year of the OECD's
69. Burt, supra note 37, at 1039.
70. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
296 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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inception, the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and
the Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations (to-
gether the "Codes of Liberalisation") were proclaimed. Al-
though the Codes of Liberalisation are not identical in all re-
spects, they share the general objective of the removal of restric-
tions on specified lists of current invisible operations and capital
movements. The ultimate goal is that residents of different
OECD members be "as free to transact business with each other
as are residents of a single country."'"
While the Codes of Liberalisation have the legal status of an
OECD decision, which is binding on all OECD members, imple-
mentation of the Codes of Liberalisation entails "peer pressure"
exercised through policy reviews and country examinations.
The aim is to encourage members to undertake unilateral,
rather than negotiated, liberalization. As a result, enforcement
of the Codes of Liberalisation consists of a framework of notifica-
tion, examination, and consultation, with the purpose of moni-
toring observance with the liberalizing prescriptions. 72 Further-
more, the commitments made by OECD members under the
Codes of Liberalisation do not bind them to specific liberalizing
measures. In accordance with this principle of autonomy, mem-
bers are also permitted under Article 2 of both Codes to enter
their own list of reservations, so that they will not be bound to
introduce liberalizing measures in certain sectors of their choos-
ing. In addition, Article 7 of the Codes entitles members to reg-
ister temporary derogations for which specific justifications must
be presented.73
Despite the Codes' shortcomings, when OECD members
71. OECD, OECD CODES OF LIBERALISATION, available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/investment/legal-instruments/codes.htm. The OECD provides the following defi-
nition of "invisible,"
'Invisible' is the general term applied to all exchanges in which no merchan-
dise is involved. Within this group there are current and capital operations
and most of these consist of a transaction between two parties and a related
transfer of money. The OECD has not attempted to give theoretical defini-




73. OECD, OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, arts. 2, 7, at http://
www.oecd.org/daf/investment/legal-instruments/clcmart.htm. See also Code of Liberali-
zation of Current Invisible Operations, arts. 2, 7, at http://www.oecd.org/daf/investnent/
legal-instruments/clioart.htm [hereinafter Codes of Liberalization]. For a discussion of
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left the Uruguay Round feeling that their aspirations with re-
spect to investment protection and liberalization had not been
fulfilled, they believed the OECD had the most extensive exper-
tise in the area of investment liberalization.
A. The Start of the OECD MAI Negotiations
In May 1995, the Committee on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises ("CIME") and the Committee on
Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions ("CMIT")
presented a report at an OECD Council meeting at the Ministe-
rial level. This report indicated that the time was "ripe to negoti-
ate an MAI in the OECD. '7 4 The conclusion of the CIME and
CMIT was based on work conducted by both committees since
1991, and by five working groups which had been set up in 1994
to undertake technical and analytical work on (i) liberalization
obligations under existing OECD instruments, (ii) liberalization
obligations in new areas, (iii) investment protection, (iv) dispute
settlement, and (v) the involvement of non-members of the
OECD. The solutions devised by these working groups were
partly inspired by investment-related agreements negotiated dur-
ing that period, such as NAFTA, the Energy Charter, and bilat-
eral investment agreements. 7
5
Based on its report, the CIME and the CMIT requested and
obtained, from the OECD Council, the mandate to begin negoti-
ations with the aim of concluding an MAI by the time of the
Ministerial-level OECD Council meeting in 1997.76
B. The Objectives of the OECD MAI
In light of the WTO's perceived failure to create a frame-
work for the regulation of foreign, direct investment, the objec-
tives for the MAI, reaffirmed by the OECD Ministers at the May
1996 OECD Council, were as follows:
(i) the creation of a strong and comprehensive multilat-
eral legal framework for foreign direct investment
("FDI") among participating countries;
the Codes of Liberalization, see DAVID HENDERSON, THE MAI AFFAIR: A STORY AND ITS
LESSONS 62-66 (1999).
74. OECD, supra note 6.
75. OECD, supra note 6.
76. OECD, supra note 5.
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(ii) the reduction of barriers to FDI and an increase in
legal security for international investors;
(iii) "level the playing field" by providing for national
treatment;
(iv) a legally binding treaty containing effective provisions
for the settlement of disputes; and
(v) a free-standing treaty open to all OECD countries and
the European Union, and to accession by non-OECD
countries.77
As is evident from the tight timeline for completion of the
treaty, the OECD Members had anticipated a smooth negotia-
tion of the MAJ in light of the involvement of industrialized
economies in the process, who seemed to agree on the main
goals for the agreement. However, the large amount of square
brackets and footnotes in the MAI Negotiating Text of April
1998 proves that the contrary was true.78 Some of the most rele-
vant aspects of the draft MAI Negotiating Text included the fol-
lowing.
1. Scope of the Treaty
MAI negotiators set out an extremely broad definition of
investment, which included every kind of asset owned or con-
trolled, directly or indirectly, by an investor, including direct and
portfolio investments, real estate, intellectual property rights,
rights under contracts, and rights conferred under authoriza-
tions and permits. Most importantly, the MAI was designed to
cover established, as well as future investments. All such invest-
ments would have received the better of national and MFN treat-
ment.
79
77. William H. Witherell, An Agreement on Investment, THE OECD OBSERVER, Oct.
1996, at 6, available at http://www.oecd.org/publications/observer/202/006-009a.pdf;
see also Communiqu: Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level, THE OECD OBSERVER, May
21-22, 1996, available at http://www.oecd.org; Ministerial Communiqug, THE OECD OB-
SERVER, June 1996, available at http://www.oecd.org.
78. OECD, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: CONSOLIDATED TEXT AND
COMMENTARY, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL, FISCAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS (1998), at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/fdi/mai/negtext.htm [hereinafter Negotiating
Text]; Dymond, supra note 8, at 29-30.
79. Riyaz Dattu & John W. Boscariol, A Quick Primer on the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, 27 INT'L Bus. L. 50, 51 (1999).
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2. Investment Protection
As in most bilateral investment agreements between indus-
trialized countries, the MAI would have required that all invest-
ments receive fair and equitable treatment, and full and con-
stant protection and security. Furthermore, expropriations or
other measures tantamount to expropriation were not to be per-
mitted, except where such measures were taken in the public
interest, in a non-discriminatory fashion, accompanied by the
payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation and
in accordance with due process of law. Compensation would
have to be paid without delay, equal the fair market value of the
investment before the expropriation occurred, and be fully con-
ceivable and freely transferable. The standards of compensation
adopted in the MAI negotiating text provide a codification of
developed countries' views on the customary international law
on expropriation and compensation. 0
Despite the general agreement among MAI negotiators to
the terms of investment protection, a number of non-govern-
mental organizations ("NGOs") forcefully opposed these provi-
sions in light of the increasing number of NAFTA Chapter 11
challenges brought by U.S. businesses with respect to Canada's
environmental regulations under the investor-state dispute reso-
lution mechanism."1 In their view, the protection of investment
against government environmental regulatory measures would
provide higher priority to individual property rights and the
profit-making capacity of corporations over the right of the state
to regulate in the area of environment or labor.
8 2
3. Performance Requirements and Investment Incentives
The MAI negotiators agreed to prohibit the use of perform-
ance requirements (e.g., export and local sourcing require-
ments) under the agreement. In addition to the similar prohibi-
tions contained in the TRIMs Agreement and in NAFTA, the
MAI's Negotiating Text extended the prohibition to trade in ser-
80. See id.
81. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, 38 I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998). This
case was settled in July 1998 for US$13,000,000.
82. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ("UNCTAD"),
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, 1999: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF
DEVELOPMENT 134 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 World Investment Report].
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vices and to non-trade related performance requirements, such
as technology transfers.
The prohibition on investment incentives was a much more
controversial issue among MAI negotiators. While some parties
believed that such a prohibition avoided costly programs
whereby countries compete to attract foreign investment, others
argued that certain incentives were needed to promote regional,
social, environmental, and developmental goals.
4. Exceptions and Reservations
The availability of certain exceptions and reservations to the
MAI was the source of a great deal of disagreement among MAI
negotiators. Even with respect to the standard national security
and international peace exception, some parties expressed con-
cern about the scope of this exception. In particular, MAI nego-
tiators were concerned with the repeated use of this ground for
non-compliance with treaty obligations.83
Other grounds for non-compliance with the MAI discussed
during the negotiations were the exclusion of fiscal and taxation
measures from the MAI's realm, prudential measures in relation
to the financial services industry, as well as temporary derogation
for balance-of-payment reasons.
Canada was the most vocal proponent of a general cultural
exception clause in the MAI that would have exempted any mea-
sure to regulate investment of foreign companies and the condi-
tions of activity of these companies, so long as such measures
were taken "to preserve and promote cultural and linguistic di-
versity."84 In addition to Canada's sweeping proposal, a number
of negotiators, including those from France, suggested that cul-
tural industries be excluded from the MAI. However, the parties
never agreed on the scope to be granted to a cultural exception.
Finally, the availability and scope of country-specific excep-
tions continued to be the source of heated debate even at the
time that the Negotiating Text was made public.8 5 The MAI en-
visaged a List A of country-specific exceptions that would include
83. Dattu & Boscariol, supra note 79, at 52. See also R. Dattu &J. Boscariol, GAT7
Article XXI, Helms Burton and the Continuing Abuse of the National Security Exception, 28 CAN.
Bus. L. J. 198 (1997); 1999 World Investment Report, supra note 82, at 135.
84. 1999 World Investment Report, supra note 82, at 133.
85. Id. at 133; see also Negotiating Text, supra note 78.
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existing non-conforming measures. In addition, there was a pro-
posal contemplating a List B of exceptions. This category would
include a limited number of new, but unspecified, non-con-
forming measures to be excepted from the MAI obligation of
national and MFN treatment. Among potential areas to be cov-
ered by List B were preferential economic policies for aboriginal
peoples, minorities, and cultures.8"
5. Dispute Settlement
Like most bilateral investment agreements and Chapter 11
of NAFTA, the MAI was to provide for both state-to-state and
investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms by means of arbi-
tration. The MAI would be governed by the procedures estab-
lished by the International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes ("ICSID"), the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), or the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") Court of Arbitration. As of the
publication of the Negotiating Text, there had not been an
agreement among the MAI negotiators on whether certain MAI
provisions (e.g., the pre-establishment rights of investors and in-
vestments) would be excluded from the private dispute resolu-
tion mechanism.87
6. Sub-national Authorities
With respect to sub-national authorities, divergent views
arose with respect to two issues. First, federal states, such as Ca-
nada, referred to the constitutional difficulty of binding their
provinces to the MAI without a prior consultation process. Sec-
ond, and more controversial, was the question raised by the
United States as to whether the MAI's national treatment re-
quirements would be met by applying the treatment accorded to
investors in any one of the other states.88
7. Regional Economic Integration Organizations
The EU proposed the addition of a regional economic inte-
86. Negotiating Text, supra note 78; see also 1999 World Investment Report, supra
note 82, at 131.
87. Dattu & Boscariol, supra note 79, at 52-53; see also 1999 World Investment Re-
port, supra note 83, at 135.
88. Negotiating Text, supra note 78; see also 1999 World Investment Report, supra
note 82, at 132.
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gration organization exception, dubbed the "REIO clause," to
the treaty, whereby the EU would have been allowed to grant
preferential treatment to its members without having to extend
the same treatment to all MAI signatories. While the EU argued
that this clause would apply to fields not covered by the MAI, the
disagreement continued until the end of the MAI negotiations,
as the other parties felt that a REIO clause ran counter to the
main goals of the MAI.89
8. Labor and Environmental Issues
In response to the vociferous concerns raised by NGOs with
respect to the social and environmental impact of the MAI,
negotiators began to consider the possibility of including provi-
sions on labor and the environment to the agreement. The is-
sue, including whether a commitment not to lower labor and
environmental standards in the MAI would be binding on gov-
ernments, and thus subject to the MAI's dispute resolution
mechanisms, remained unresolved at the end of 1998 when MAI
negotiations broke down. 90
As the foregoing discussion reveals, despite the absence of
developing countries from the negotiating process-a factor that
had been anticipated to facilitate agreement among all parties-
the like-minded economies of the OECD and the EU were una-
ble to overcome a large number of the obstacles that arose in a
number of areas of the MAI.
C. The Lessons from the MAI's Failure at the OECD
The lessons of the MAI's failure at the OECD are:
1. The willingness of countries to enter into regional and
bilateral investment agreements does not necessarily sig-
nify the unconditional willingness to sign onto a global
investment agreement that grants all states, and all inves-
tors of all states, rights vis-d-vis all other potential host
states of investments.
2. An attempt to negotiate an MAI that provides high stan-
dards of liberalization and protection among countries
that already have well-established, liberal, and transpar-
89. 1999 World Investment Report, supra note 82, at 132.
90. Id. at 134.
A JOURNEY FROM HAVANA TO PARIS
ent foreign investment policies is likely to result in fail-
ure, because the benefits to be yielded from such an
agreement are expected to be marginal. However, the
political cost to the governments of the negotiating coun-
tries can be quite significant.91
3. The WTO, with its broad mandate over trade matters
(and the give and take that this permits during trade ne-
gotiations), rather than the OECD, is a more conducive
forum for negotiating an MAI that is likely to yield rela-
tively significant benefits, which can then be expected to
provide the necessary political impetus to the govern-
ments of signatory countries.
4. Furthermore, it is to be expected that in a difficult and
controversial area, such as investment liberalization and
protection, patience and diligence will be required. This
is confirmed by the recent experience of the Uruguay
Round negotiations, which at least resulted in pared-
down versions of investment liberalization and protec-
tion measures in the TRIMs Agreement, GATS, and
TRIPs. On the other hand, the OECD's overly ambitious
and fast-paced negotiations in Paris could not arrive at
any sort of agreement even among like-minded coun-
tries.
IV. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
A. Bilateral Investment Agreements
The precursor to the modern version of the bilateral invest-
ment treaty ("BIT") was the Treaty of Amity and Commerce
signed between the United States and France in 1778, which gov-
erned their commercial relations.92 This was followed by a num-
ber of treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
("FCN") entered into by the United States prior to World War II,
which also governed the commercial relations between the
United States and each respective signatory. While the FCNs
were mainly concerned with the shipping and trading rights and
obligations of the parties, they also provided general obligations
91. Dymond, supra note 8, at 26.
92. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 621
(1992).
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to protect the property of the nationals of the other state.93
After World War II and Europe's economic recovery, Euro-
pean countries negotiated investment protection treaties with
non-market economies and their former colonies. Germany
signed the first of these Bilateral Investment Protection Agree-
ments ("BIPAs") with Pakistan in 1959 and many other Euro-
pean countries followed thereafter.94
While the United States increasingly began including provi-
sions for the protection of investments in its FCN treaties after
the war, the expansion of the European network of BIPAs was
the driving force behind the BITs that the United States entered
into in the 1960s and thereafter. The increasing number of BITs
provided greater protection for United States nationals' invest-
ment in foreign countries. As of January 1997, however, the
United States was not among the ten countries that had signed
the largest number of BITs.95
Since the 1960s, BITs-called BIPAs in Europe and Foreign
Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements ("FIPAs") in
Canada 96-have spread as the principal means of ensuring recip-
rocal protection of foreign, direct investment between countries.
At the end of 1996, 155 countries had signed 1330 BITs, 822 of
which had been concluded by developed countries. 97 By 1999,
93. Michael P. Avramovich, The Protection of International Investment at the Start of the
Twenty-First Centuy: Will Anachronistic Notions of Business Render Irrelevant the OECD's Mul-
tilateral Agreement on Investment?, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1201, 1233 (1998).
94. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Re-
gime, 19 MicH. J. INT'L L. 373, 383 (1998).
95. As of January 1997, the top 10 signatories of bilateral investment treaties were
Germany (111), United Kingdom (87), Romania (82), Switzerland (81), China (80),
France (74), Netherlands (58), Poland (58), Italy (53), and the Republic of Korea (49).
SeeJAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION ("JETRO"), WHITE PAPER ON FOREIGN DIREcr
INVESTMENT 46 (1998) [hereinafter 1998JETRO WHITE PAPER].
96. To date, in addition to its commitments with Canada and the United States
under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, Canada has signed 21 FIPAs with Argentina, Armenia,
Barbados, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary, Latvia, Lebanon,
Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, South Af-
rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See INTERNATIONAL CEN-
TRE FOR SEFFLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES ("ICSID"): BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREA-
TIES, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/canada.htm; see also CANADIAN DEP'T
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE: LISTING OF CANADA'S FOREIGN INVESTMENT PRO-
TECTION AND PROMOTION AGREEMENTS ("FIPAs"), at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/fipa-e.asp.
97. 1998JETRO WHITE PAPER, supra note 95, at 18. See also ICSID, LIST OF PARTIES
TO BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/
main.htm.
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the number of BITs signed was 1856.98 Of these 1856 BITs, the
United States has signed 46 BITs, in addition to its commit-
ments, vis-a-vis Canada and Mexico, with respect to foreign in-
vestment contained in Chapter 11 of NAFTA.
This web of bilateral agreements for the protection of in-
vestment offers each signatory reciprocal rights and obligations
that are negotiated on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the
needs and requirements of the signatory to a particular agree-
ment. While it may be more costly and time-consuming for each
country to enter into a multitude of bilateral agreements, it pro-
vides a means, particularly for countries that are hosts of foreign
investment, to attract investment flows from the investor country
in exchange for relinquishing a certain degree of autonomy over
their economic policy.99
B. Regional Investment Agreements
The trend noted at the bilateral level of the proliferation of
BITs is replicated in the regional sphere across all continents.
The willingness of countries to enter into regional investment
treaties, therefore, contrasts sharply with the reluctance of those
same countries to sign onto an MAI.
1. North America and Europe
In the Western hemisphere, NAFTA was the first regional
treaty that contained far-reaching investment provisions, includ-
ing an investor-state dispute settlement procedure. 0 0 What is
also significant about NAFTA is the fact that its membership,
composed of Canada, the United States, and Mexico, combines
developed and developing countries, which are all bound by
high standards of investment protection.
The investment provisions that provide for the regulation
98. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000: CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND Ac-
QUISITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT (2000), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/pub/
pslwir0O.en.htm.
99. Michael Hart, A Multiateral Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment: Why Now?, in
INVESTMENT RULES FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMy. ENHANCING ACCESS TO MARKETS 36, 89-
90 (Pierre Sauve & Daniel Schwanen eds., 1996); see also Asante, supra note 31, at 607
(stating that the bilateral investment treaties concluded by developing countries with
capital-exporting states constitute little more than "assurances and privileges conceded
to foreign companies in return for the bundle of benefits expected from a purely bilat-
eral relationship").
100. NAFTA ch. 11.
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and liberalization of investment within the EU are contained in
Title III of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 10 1
entitled "Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital." In
particular, Chapter Four sets out the requirement that all restric-
tions be removed on the movement of capital and on payments,
not only among EC Member States, but also between Member
States of the European Community and third countries.'0 2
In addition to the foregoing agreements, the 1990s also saw
a sharp increase in the number of regional economic arrange-
ments between developing countries that included investment
clauses as part of their co-operation initiatives.
2. South and Central America
In South America, the member countries of the Andean
Community' approved on March 21, 1991, Decision 291 on the
Treatment of Foreign Capital of the Cartagena Agreement. On
January 17, 1994, members of the Southern Cone Common Mar-
ket ("MERCOSUR")'° 4 approved the Colonia Protocol for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments in MERCOSUR. The
endorsement of a Framework Agreement for the Creation of a
Free Trade Area between the Andean Community and
MERCOSUR on April 16, 1998, achieved further economic inte-
gration, coupled with investment regulation.
The Caribbean Community ("CARICOM") 10 5 approved the
101. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, Oj. C. 224/1 (1992),[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [here-
inafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L. 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R.741 [hereinafter SEA]. The Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty") was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related
acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1(1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These
amendments were incorporated into the EC Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty
were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, O.J. C 340/3(1997), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty],
incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra.
102. Id. arts. 56-60.
103. The member countries of the Andean Community are Bolivia, Colombia, Ec-
uador, Peril and Venezuela.
104. The MERCOSUR members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
Chile and Bolivia are MERCOSUR associates.
105. CARICOM member countries are: Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
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Principles and Guidelines on Foreign Investment at the CAR-
ICOM Heads of Government Conference in 1982.06 During the
1990s, two Protocols-Protocols II (Establishment, Services and
Capital) and III (Industrial Policy) Amending the Treaty Estab-
lishing the Caribbean Community-were introduced, which in-
clude liberalizing investment provisions.
In turn, members of CARICOM entered into a Free Trade
Agreement with the Dominican Republic, 107 which contains an
Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments. Earlier agreements between CARICOM and Colombia,
on the one hand,"0 ' and Venezuela, on the other,109 contain pro-
visions that recognize the importance of investment stimulation;
however, no specific investment rules are provided for in those
agreements.
The so-called Group of Three (Colombia, Mexico, and Ven-
ezuela) entered into a free trade agreement in 1995 that in-
cludes a chapter exclusively dedicated to investment.1 0 Mexico
also entered into a free trade agreement with El Salvador, Guate-
mala, and Honduras, which contains an investment chapter."1
In addition, the Free Trade Agreement Between Central
America and the Republic of Chile dedicates a chapter to the
regulation of investment. 11 2
3. Asia
The previously discussed trend in Latin America toward re-
gional economic integration arrangements, and the inclusion of
investment measures in such agreements, is now prevalent in
Asia. As such, the Ministers of the Association of South East
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Monserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Antigua, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.
106. CARICOM, Principles and Guidelines on Foreign Investment (1982), availa-
ble at http://www.alca.ftaa.oas.org/cp-bits/english99/CARICOM.asp.
107. Entered into force on January 1, 1999.
108. Signed on July 24, 1994.
109. Signed on October 13, 1992.
110. Treaty on Free Trade Between the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of
Venezuela and the United Mexican States, June 13, 1994, art. XVII, (entered into force
on Jan. 1, 1995).
111. Treaty on Free Trade ch. XIV.
112. Free Trade Agreement Between Central America and the Republic of Chile,
ch. X, Oct. 18, 1999. The Central American parties to the treaty include Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Chapter X of the agreement deals with
the subject of investment.
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Asian Nations ("ASEAN") signed on October 7, 1998, a Frame-
work Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area ("AlA"), which
had been ratified by all ASEAN members. This Framework
Agreement complements the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments and its 1996 Proto-
col.'" The commitments set out under the AIA include the
opening of all industries and the grant of national treatment-
other than those excluded under a Temporary Exclusion List
("TEL") or a Sensitive List ("SL")-to ASEAN investors by 2010,
and to all investors by 2020.'"
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
("SAARC") is currently considering a Regional Agreement on
Promotion and Protection of Investments within the region as a
trade facilitation measure. 1 5 Similarly, BIMSTEC ("Bangladesh,
India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation"),
a unique organization in that it groups two members of ASEAN
with three countries from South Asia, was formed in late 1997
for the purpose of facilitating economic cooperation among its
members. BIMSTEC is currently discussing a Free Trade Agree-
ment that would include rules on investment liberalization." 1
6
4. Africa
Even in Africa, which is characterized for its historical oppo-
sition to the liberalization of foreign direct investment, a num-
ber of regional organizations have begun to include investment
provisions in their existing trade agreements, or to discuss stand-
alone investment agreements to attract more foreign direct in-
vestment.
Members of the Central African Economic and Monetary
113. The members of the Association of South East Asian Nations ("ASEAN") are
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand, and Vietnam. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN NEWS
at http://www.asean.or.id.
114. Id.
115. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation ("SAARC") was estab-
lished when its Charter was formally adopted in December 1985. Its member countries
are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. See South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation ("SAARC"), About SAARC, at http://
www.saarc-sec.org.
116. Member countries of BIMSTEC are Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka,
and Thailand. Nepal became an Observer at the Ministerial Meeting in Dhaka in De-
cember 1998. See Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooper-
ation, Useful Links, at http://www.mfa.go.th/bimstec/html/useful.html.
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Community ("CEMAC"), which succeeded the Central African
Customs and Economic Union in 1999, are currently negotiating
the CEMAC Community Charter on Investment, as part of
CEMAC's ultimate goal of attaining the free circulation of capi-
tal and goods among its members.
17
On October 31, 2000, the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa ("COMESA"), established in 1994, launched the
first ever African Free Trade Area ("COMESA FTA"), which in-
cludes rules on investment.""8 The previously negotiated Treaty
Establishing the Southern African Development Community
("SADC"), signed in 1992, binds all countries of the region to
coordinate, harmonize, and rationalize their policies and strate-
gies for sustainable development in all areas of human endeav-
our. The SADC created a Finance and Investment Sector work-
ing group charged with drafting a Protocol on Finance and In-
vestment to be developed over a period of five years from July
1999, and culminating in the Protocol's ratification byJuly 2004.
Furthermore, sectoral sub-committees are currently developing
memoranda of understanding in each of their respective areas
that will feed into the development of the Protocol and specific
annexes. 1
19
The West African Economic and Monetary Union
("UEMOA"), whose founding treaty came into force on August
1, 1998, was drafting a Community Code on Investment sched-
uled for adoption on January 1, 2000.120 Finally, the Treaty es-
tablishing the East African Community ("EAC"), signed on No-
117. Member countries of CEMAC are Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. See Les Journees Cemac, Programmes, at
http://www.arh.fr/cemac.htm; see also Africabiz, Brief on CEMAC, at http://busines-
safrica.hispeed.com/africabiz/ezine/ca/newscaf.htm#cemac.
118. COMESA's member countries are Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mau-
ritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. COMESA, established in 1994, replaced the Preferential Trade Area for
Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), which had been in existence since 1981, to take
advantage of a larger market size, to share the region's common heritage and destiny
and to allow greater social and economic co-operation, with the ultimate objective of
creating an economic community. See http://www.comesa.int/backgrnd/back-
index.htm.
119. Member countries of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See http://www.sadc.int; see also http://
www.sadcreview.com/Default.htm.
120. The UEMOA consists of Burkina Faso, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau,
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vember 30, 1999, includes certain investment rules.
1 21
C. Inter-Regional Investment Agreements
In addition, a number of economic organizations that en-
compass countries from different continents are in the process
of including investment provisions as part of their treaties of in-
tegration. One such example is the Indian Ocean Rim Associa-
tion for Regional Cooperation 122 ("IOR-ARC"), whose objectives
include the removal of impediments to trade and investment
within the region and the promotion of trade liberalization. As
a result, at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting, held in Oman
in January 2000, the trade and investment agenda was put in
place, symbolized by the holding of an inaugural Trade and In-
vestment Working Group meeting. In Oman, Ministers adopted
a plan of action, which included an agreement that a set of in-
vestment regulations be completed before the next Ministerial
meeting in March 2001.121
The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation ("APEC"), which
includes countries from different continents in its membership,
is another international organization that negotiated an invest-
ment agreement among its members.' 24
Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. See Union Economique et Monetaire Quest Africaine,
at http://212.52.130.131/Index.htm.
121. Member countries of the EAC are the United Republic of Tanzania, the Re-
public of Kenya, and the Republic of Uganda. See The East African Community, at http://
www.newafrica.com/eac/treaty/principles.htm.
122. The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation ("IOR-ARC")
formed in Mauritius in 1997, has the following members: Australia, Bangladesh, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Sey-
chelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, UAE and Yemen. Dia-
logue partners are the UK, Japan, China, and Egypt. The Indian Ocean Tourism Or-
ganisation ("IOTO") is an observer organization. The IOR-ARC is a consensus-based
organisation whose purpose is to facilitate and promote economic cooperation amongst
member States. See Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum, at http://www.ficci.com/ficci/
International/ior.html; see also Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/iorarc.
123. Id.
124. The Joint Statement issued at the 12th APEC Ministerial Meeting in Brunei
Darussalam in November, 2000 expressed support for APEC's Trade and Investment
Facilitation Program and endorsed the work of the Committee on Trade and Invest-
ment. The members of APEC are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, the
People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chi-
nese Taipei, Thailand, the United States of America, and Vietnam. APEC's Official
Observers are ASEAN, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council ("PECC") and South Pa-
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A promising trend in the quest for further liberalization of
investment rules is found in the expansion of inter-regional
trade and investment agreements, which has proven to be suc-
cessful. For example, the EU and MERCOSUR are in themid-
dle of far-reaching negotiations toward an Inter-regional Associa-
tion Agreement that would not only cover the liberalization of
trade in goods and services, but would also deal with govern-
ment procurement, competition policies, intellectual property
rights, trade defense instruments, and a dispute settlement
mechanism, in addition to investment. 125
The EU has been the undeniable leader in establishing co-
operation frameworks with other regional organizations. In
South America, in addition to MERCOSUR, the EU signed a
Framework Co-operation Agreement between the EEC and the
Cartagena Agreement and its member states, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Venezuela in 1993, which became effective in 1998.
The agreement has the objective of expanding the areas of co-
operation between the two regions in the political, economic,
trade, and investment sectors. 126
The EU has also established a close relationship with
ASEAN, based on a Co-operation Agreement between the par-
ties signed in 1980. Under the framework of this agreement, a
Joint Co-Operation Committee ('3CC") was created, which
meets approximately every eighteen months. At the June 1999
meeting of the JCC in Bangkok, a Work Program for the Imple-
mentation of the New Dynamic was adopted, which focuses on
increasing the business and trade ties between the two regional
associations including, inter alia, the topic of investment and cap-
ital flows. 127
Also in the context of its close relationship with Asian coun-
tries, the Asia-Europe Meeting ("ASEM") was started as "an infor-
mal process of dialogue and cooperation bringing together the
fifteen EU member states and the European Commission, with
cific Forum ("SPF"). See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Member Economies, at
http://www.apecsec.org.sg.
125. European Union, The EU & MERCOSUR, at http://www.europa.eu.int/
comm/external_ relations/ MERCOSU R/assneg_text/ass-neg-text.htm.
126. European Union, The EU & the Andean Countries, at http://www.europa.eu.
int/comm/external relations/andean/intro.
127. European Union, The EU & ASEAN, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/ex-
ternalrelations/asean/intro.
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ten Asian countries (Brunei, China, Indonesia, Japan, South Ko-
rea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore; Thailand, and Viet-
nam)."128 In the economic and financial field, the activities that
have received priority attention at ASEM include the-reduction
of barriers to trade and investment. In this context, in 1998,
ASEM adopted a Trade Facilitation Action Plan ("TFAP") and
an Investment Promotion Action Plan ("IPAP"). The latter
"aims at promoting two-way investment flows between [the] two
regions"'129 by addressing investment promotion, as well as in-
vestment policy issues.
The relationship between the EU and SAARC has not ad-
vanced as far as both sides would have desired, mainly as a result
of the conflicts within SAARC, in particular because of both In-
dia and Pakistan's presence in the association. However, the
parties continue to work towards deepening their economic co-
operation.3 0
Having the energy sector as the basis for co-operation, the
investment provisions of the Energy Charter constitute a prime
example of inter-regional integration. The Energy Charter sets
out investment protection and liberalization requirements to be
implemented by countries of different geographic regions from
the OECD, as well as CIS and East European countries. 3 '
Another testament to the proliferation of inter-regional in-
vestment agreements is the recently developed cooperation
framework between Japan and CARICOM, entitled "A New
Framework for Japan-CARICOM Cooperation for the Twenty-
first Century, 1132 which contemplates an increased flow of invest-
ment and trade between Japan and CARICOM Members. Simi-
larly, the European Free Trade Area ("EFTA") and Mexico ini-
tialled on November 3, 2000, in Geneva, a free trade agreement
that, in addition to public procurement, competition policy, in-
tellectual property, and an effective dispute settlement system,
will cover services and investment. Under the agreement, EFTA
128. European Union, The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), at http://www.europa.eu.
int/comm/externalrelationsrelations/asem/intro.
129. European Union,. Investment Promotion Action Plan ("IPAP"), at http://
www.europa.int/comm/external-relations/asem/otheractivities/eco-pillar.htm.
130. European Union, The EU & SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Co-
operation), at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/saarc/intro).
131. Energy Charter, supranote 33.
132. Japan, CARICOM Set Up New Cooperation Framework, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 8,
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will benefit from the same level of access to the Mexican market
that is enjoyed by the EU, the United States, and Canada.1 3
Canada also has led the effort to establish trade and invest-
ment links with other regional associations. As part of its ex-
panding relationship with Latin American economies, in 1998,
Canada signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Trade and
Investment ("MOUTI") with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua, which are members of the Central
American Common Market ("CACM").134 In the same year, Ca-
nada signed a Trade and Investment-Cooperation Arrangement
("TICA") with MERCOSUR,13 5 while it negotiated another TICA
with the Andean Community.1
3 6
A prime example of Canada's efforts to liberalize invest-
ment through inter-regional or bilateral means is the Canada-
Chile Free Trade Agreement, which Canada signed in 1996; Part
Three sets out the obligations of the two parties in the areas of
investment, services, telecommunications, competition policy,
and the entry of business persons.1 37 With respect to the treat-
ment of investors and their investments, the Canada-Chile agree-
ment provides for the better of national and MFN treatment 3 '
and the minimum standard of treatment in accordance with in-
ternational law. In the Canada-Chile agreement, the latter stan-
dard concerns fair and equitable treatment, full protection, and
security. 139 In respect of international law standard adopted for
the purposes of expropriation, the Canada-Chile agreement in-
corporates the Hull Formula. The agreement requires that ex-
propriation be for a public purpose and non-discriminatory, in
accordance with due process of law and international law (as set
out in Article G-05), and contingent on compensation
equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated invest-
ment immediately before the expropriation took place payable
133. EFFA, Mexico Conclude Free Trade Talks, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 3, 2000.
134. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, at http://www.
dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/tieca-e.asp. The MOUTI was signed in San Jose, Costa Rica,
on March 18, 1998.
135. Id. The TICA with MERCOSUR was signed in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on
June 16, 1998.
136. Id.
137. Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement: Part Three, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/
tna-nac/cda-chile/menu.asp [hereinafter Canada-Chile Agreement].
138. Id. arts. G-02, G-03, and G-04.
139. Id. art. G-05.
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without delay and fully realizable."'
It is interesting to note that, while the Canada-Chile agree-
ment includes a provision for investor-state dispute settlement,
this mechanism is restricted to matters concerning state enter-
prises and monopolies. 4 ' Furthermore, in light of the numer-
ous NAFTA, investor-state disputes against Canada, which allege
that governmental environment measures have resulted in some-
thing tantamount to expropriation, the Canada-Chile agreement
clarifies in Article G-14 that nothing in the investment chapter of
the agreement is to be construed so as to prevent a party from
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing measures that it considers
appropriate in order to ensure that investment activity in its ter-
ritory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental con-
cerns. 142
V. THE AFTERMATH OF SEATTLE
Subsequent to the failure of the MAI negotiations at the
OECD, the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial Meeting of the
WTO in December 1999 sent a cautionary message to trade
negotiators worldwide concerning all areas of trade policy.
With particular regard to investment, the lesson seems to be
that in order to continue the liberalizing trend, the best route
may be to achieve incremental gains with bilateral investment
treaties and regional agreements. Furthermore, progress in the
multilateral arena can still be achieved within GATS and TRIMs
by taking advantage of the built-in agenda in these agreements
for further negotiations. However, as with bilateral and regional
agreements, further liberalization under these agreements needs
to be undertaken incrementally. Extensive studies should be
conducted in advance of WTO negotiations or meetings in order
to understand the extent to which a consensus may be obtained
in the critical areas where to date there has been lack of consen-
sus. The unresolved, long list of issues from the MAT negotia-
tions at the OECD should generate the necessary topics on
which extensive studies need to be undertaken before the
launch of any new negotiations for securing an MAI.
140. Id. art. G-10.
141. Id. arts. G-16-G-18.
142. Id. art. G-14.
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CONCLUSION
The quest for an MAI, with high standards of liberalization
and protection, has remained elusive for more than half a cen-
tury. Meanwhile, the recent proliferation of bilateral, regional,
and inter-regional agreements that provide for investment mea-
sures suggests that in recent years, the vast majority of WTO
members have developed a significant interest in maintaining in-
vestment policies hospitable to foreign investors. The degree of
antipathy to foreign investors and foreign investments in the
world community that existed for close to thirty years since the
1950s, when many of the developing countries began to receive
their independence, no longer exists.
However, the developing countries, having embarked on
the road towards welcoming and protecting foreign investments
under the framework of bilateral and regional agreements with
reciprocal benefits obtained during the negotiations of such
agreements, are in no rush to embrace an MAI. It is unlikely
that a multilateral agreement will provide the same reciprocal
bargaining position and ability to attract investment flows from
capital exporting countries, as do bilateral agreements where
such investment flows are bargained for in exchange for the re-
linquishment of a certain degree of autonomy over the host
country's economy.
With the passage of time, and an increasing web of invest-
ment liberalization and protection agreements, the relative
merit of an MAI will become more evident to most WTO mem-
ber countries. Indeed, the very existence of a web of agree-
ments, which will have advanced liberal and hospitable foreign
investment policies on a more universal basis, should inevitably
lead to the logic of a universal set of rules on investment mea-
sures.
The OECD member countries worked from the same type
of logic when, in 1995, they determined that the time was ripe
for negotiating an MAI. However, their mistake was their pre-
emptive decision to embark on a MAI-more time needed to
pass before it is time. Furthermore, the choice of the OECD as
the negotiating forum among like-minded countries also pro-
vided a significant basis for the failure of the MAI.
The WTO, with its broad trade mandate, its inclusive na-
ture, and its experience in providing incremental gains through
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rounds of negotiations that build upon a series of compromises
reached during each previous negotiating round, provides the
best forum for negotiating and concluding an MAI. With the
successful achievement of the TRIMs Agreement, GATS, and
TRIPs, during the Uruguay Round, the first significant set of
steps have already been taken.
